The US War: Dismantling the International Criminal Court Brick by Brick

Estimated reading time at 200 wpm: 33 minutes

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Not everyone knows that Marco Rubio has vowed to dismantle the International Criminal Court. The process has been on the way for about the last year. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal framework, historical context, and ongoing litigation arising from the United States’ coordinated campaign to dismantle the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”). The analysis examines the legal premises advanced by the U.S. administration, the response of international law scholars and institutions, the domestic constitutional challenges mounted in U.S. federal courts, and the countermeasures adopted by international actors, particularly within the European Union.

While the campaign is unlikely to achieve the statutory dissolution of a treaty-based international body, it has generated significant operational disruption and accelerated structural decoupling trends in international financial and technological infrastructure that carry long-term geopolitical consequences.

Click: Dismantling in action

II. BACKGROUND

On 13 July 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio formally announced a coordinated, whole-of-government diplomatic and economic pressure campaign designed to systematically disable the International Criminal Court.¹ Writing in the Wall Street Journal, and supported by video and press statements, Secretary Rubio declared that the United States, working in tandem with international partners, would undertake an effort to dismantle the Hague-based tribunal “brick by brick, if necessary.”²

The primary justification advanced by the State Department frames the campaign as a defence of national sovereignty, portraying the ICC as an unauthorised global body attempting to override domestic courts and the U.S. Constitution.³ The executive branch contends that the ICC has transformed from a narrow backstop designed to address extraordinary atrocities into a radical, politicised institution posing an immediate threat to American service members, border patrol agents, and political leaders.⁴ The strategy is fundamentally preemptive, aimed at weakening the administrative and operational viability of the tribunal before pending or potential investigations concerning U.S. actions or those of its allies—specifically Israel—can mature into formal indictments.⁵

III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

A. The Principle of Territorial Sovereignty

International law scholars and human rights organisations have challenged the legal premises of the dismantlement campaign, describing the “brick-by-brick” rhetoric as a mischaracterisation of established legal principles governing the Court’s jurisdiction.⁶ The ICC’s authority is built upon the principle of territorial sovereignty, meaning that when a non-member state’s national commits a core international crime on the territory of a state party that has ratified the Rome Statute, that individual is subject to local territorial jurisdiction, which has been delegated to the ICC.⁷

This jurisdictional architecture is an extension of standard domestic criminal law, under which a foreign citizen who commits a crime on U.S. soil is subject to prosecution in an American court regardless of whether their home government has consented to U.S. law.⁸

B. The Principle of Complementarity

Furthermore, the Court operates under the principle of complementarity, which dictates that the ICC may only proceed when a national system with jurisdiction is genuinely unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the core crimes itself.⁹ The complementarity regime serves as the foundational safeguard against the very sovereignty concerns invoked by the United States, ensuring that the ICC functions as a court of last resort rather than a supranational appellate body.

C. The Empirical Docket

The empirical docket of the ICC does not support the assertion of a near-exclusive focus on the United States and its allies.¹⁰ The Court has opened formal investigations in eighteen distinct situations, only one of which—the situation in Afghanistan—has included allegations involving U.S. personnel, representing approximately 5.9% of the situations under active review.¹¹ On a charged-case basis, no U.S. citizen has ever been indicted, arrested, or tried by the ICC, representing 0% of actual prosecutions.¹²

Additionally, since 2021, the Office of the Prosecutor has de-prioritised investigations into U.S. personnel in the Afghanistan situation to focus resources on alleged crimes committed by the Taliban and ISIS-K.¹³ The Court’s active docket remains focused on a wide array of international actors, including arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials, proceedings against former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, and arrest-warrant applications involving Myanmar military leader Min Aung Hlaing.¹⁴

IV. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF U.S.–ICC RELATIONS

The contemporary legal standoff between Washington and The Hague is the product of an inconsistent, cyclical relationship that has evolved over three decades.¹⁵ While the United States played a primary role in the establishment of the post-World War II ad hoc tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, its approach to a permanent international court has been defined by persistent concerns over non-member state jurisdiction.¹⁶

A. The Rome Statute and Initial Engagement (1998–2002)

Trinidad and Tobago originally initiated the modern effort by requesting that a United Nations commission evaluate the creation of a permanent court in 1989.¹⁷ Although President Bill Clinton authorised U.S. negotiators to sign the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000, he declined to submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, citing concerns over structural flaws in the treaty’s jurisdictional reach over non-member nationals.¹⁸

B. The Bush Administration and Active Opposition (2002–2005)

Under the administration of George W. Bush, policy toward the newly established Court transitioned to active opposition.¹⁹ On 6 May 2002, the Bush administration formally notified the United Nations Secretary-General that the United States did not intend to ratify the Rome Statute and recognised no legal obligations arising from its prior signature.²⁰ This was followed by the passage of the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (“ASPA”) on 2 August 2002.²¹

Introduced by Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Tom DeLay shortly after the September 11 attacks, and prior to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, ASPA aimed to insulate U.S. military operations from external judicial oversight.²² Section 2008 of ASPA, colloquially termed the “Hague Invasion Clause,” authorised the President to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to free U.S. or allied personnel detained by the ICC.²³ The legislation also prohibited domestic agencies from cooperating with the Court and restricted military assistance to Rome Statute signatories unless they signed Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreements.²⁴ The legislation provoked significant diplomatic friction, with the Dutch Ambassador to the United States formally protesting that the Dutch government was not amused by the inclusion of Section 2008.²⁵

C. Selective Engagement and Pragmatic Cooperation (2005–2025)

By the middle of the Bush administration’s second term, a pragmatic shift occurred: the United States abstained from, rather than vetoed, the UN Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC in 2005.²⁶ This pragmatic, case-by-case approach was maintained during the Obama administration, which supported the Security Council’s referral of Libya in 2011 and expanded the war crimes rewards programme to cover ICC fugitives in 2012.²⁷

In 2008, State Department legal adviser John Bellinger noted that it was not the policy of the United States to “kill the ICC.”²⁸ This policy of selective support when U.S. national interests aligned was illustrated as recently as 2022, when then-Senator Marco Rubio co-sponsored Senate Resolution 546 alongside Senator Lindsey Graham, praising the ICC and encouraging member states to petition the Court to investigate Russian war crimes in Ukraine.²⁹

Former ICC legal adviser Asier Garrido Muñoz noted a structural dissonance between U.S. support for international law and its unilateral physical actions, citing the January 3 abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to face trial in the United States as an illustrative example of this tension.³⁰

D. Sanctions Regimes and Escalation (2020–Present)

In 2020, Executive Order 13928 declared a national emergency and authorised sanctions against ICC personnel, resulting in asset blocks and travel restrictions on then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.³¹ President Biden revoked these sanctions in 2021, restoring selective dialogue and evidence-sharing, particularly regarding Ukraine.³²

The current sanctions regime, established by Executive Order 14203 and the subsequent “brick-by-brick” campaign, represents a structural departure from prior administrative policies, moving from standard legal defence or selective engagement to a direct programme targeting the physical and financial existence of the international tribunal.³³

V. EXECUTIVE ORDER 14203 AND THE SANCTIONS REGIME

A. Legal Basis and Scope

The operational implementation of the current U.S. policy relies on Executive Order 14203, titled “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court,” signed on 6 February 2025.³⁴ Invoking emergency presidential authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Order declared a national emergency.³⁵

The declared emergency was predicated on findings that any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute U.S. nationals or nationals of allied non-member states without home-state consent constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and sovereignty.³⁶ The primary trigger for this Order was the Court’s issuance of arrest warrants for high-ranking Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.³⁷

Executive Order 14203 establishes a sanctions regime authorising the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to impose asset freezes, transaction blocks, and travel restrictions on any foreign person determined to have directly engaged in, or materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, the Court’s investigations into “protected persons.”³⁸ This definition of protected persons covers current and former U.S. and allied government officials, military personnel, law enforcement, and federal prosecutors, as well as their immediate family members.³⁹

B. Phased Expansion of Designations

The scope of these sanctions was expanded in a series of phases throughout 2025:

First, Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan was designated immediately upon the executive order’s issuance in February 2025.⁴⁰

Second, in June 2025, sanctions were applied to four sitting judges: Beti Hohler (Slovenia), Reine Alapini-Gansou (Benin), Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza (Peru), and Solomy Bossa (Uganda).⁴¹

Third, in July 2025, the administration designated Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, for her reports and advocacy supporting ICC accountability.⁴²

Fourth, in August 2025, the list was expanded to include two Deputy Prosecutors and four additional judges: Kimberly Prost (Canada), Nicolas Guillou (France), Mame Mandiaye Niang (Senegal), and Nazhat Shameem Khan (Fiji).⁴³

Fifth, in September 2025, the State Department designated three prominent Palestinian human rights organisations—Al-Haq, Al-Mezan, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (“PCHR”)—for submitting evidentiary reports to the ICC.⁴⁴

Sixth, in December 2025, two additional judges, Gocha Lordkipanidze (Georgia) and Erdenebalsuren Damdin (Mongolia), were designated for their involvement in rulings connected to Israeli nationals.⁴⁵

C. Secondary Consequences and Operational Impact

These designations carry severe global secondary consequences. Because of the systemic reliance of global financial networks and technological infrastructure on U.S. dollar clearing systems and U.S.-based software providers, the sanctions function as a severe financial restriction.⁴⁶ Designated judges and prosecutors have had their personal and professional bank accounts frozen, credit cards cancelled, and access to essential commercial technology platforms—including Microsoft, Amazon, and Google—terminated.⁴⁷

Immediately following Karim Khan’s designation, Microsoft terminated his official enterprise email accounts, requiring him to shift his communications to a Swiss-based provider, while the Court itself was forced to begin a system-wide migration off U.S.-hosted software architecture.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the secondary sanctions provisions threaten civil and criminal penalties for any U.S. person or entity providing “material support” to designated individuals.⁴⁹

VI. DOMESTIC JUDICIAL CHALLENGES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION

The domestic enforcement of these sanctions has generated significant litigation in U.S. federal courts, with plaintiffs challenging the statutory authority and constitutional validity of Executive Order 14203.⁵⁰ These lawsuits, brought by international judges, human rights organisations, and legal academics, argue that the administration has exceeded its statutory authority and violated constitutional protections.⁵¹

A. Rona v. Trump

One of the earliest challenges was Gabor Rona & Lisa Davis v. Donald J. Trump, et al., filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.⁵² The plaintiffs, two U.S. law professors who serve as advisors to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, argued that the sanctions framework violated their First Amendment rights by criminalising professional collaboration, legal scholarship, and academic consulting with the Court.⁵²

On 30 July 2025, District Judge Jesse M. Furman consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits and granted a permanent injunction, enjoining all defendants except President Trump from enforcing the civil or criminal penalties of IEEPA against the plaintiffs.⁵³ Judge Furman concluded that the executive order constituted an unlawful, content-based regulation of speech-based activities that failed to survive strict scrutiny, noting that the Order severely chilled protected legal advocacy and professional academic expression.⁵³ This followed a historical lineage: in January 2021, District Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the S.D.N.Y. had similarly enjoined the previous Trump administration’s Executive Order 13928 on First Amendment grounds in a lawsuit involving Professor Gabor Rona and three other professors.⁵⁴

B. Albanese v. Trump

This precedent was reinforced by a similar constitutional battle over the targeting of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese. In February 2026, Albanese’s husband and daughter—both possessing U.S. connections affected by the asset blocks—filed a federal lawsuit in Washington, D.C., challenging the sanctions as a violation of their due process and First Amendment rights.⁵⁵

On 13 May 2026, District Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.) issued a temporary block on the sanctions, ruling that Albanese’s advisory submissions to the ICC constituted protected opinion and expression rather than a legally binding exercise of prosecution.⁵⁵ The administration responded by temporarily complying with the injunction but quickly re-designated Albanese under revised findings on 28 May 2026, demonstrating a persistent effort to test the limits of executive power.⁵⁶

C. Prost v. Trump

On 24 June 2026, three sanctioned sitting ICC judges—Kimberly Prost (Canada), Solomy Bossa (Uganda), and Reine Alapini-Gansou (Benin)—filed a landmark federal lawsuit, Prost v. Trump, in the S.D.N.Y.⁵⁷ This marked the first time in history that active international judges sued a U.S. administration in domestic court.⁵⁸ The judges, represented by the Open Society Foundations Justice Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP, advanced three principal arguments:

First, that the invocation of emergency powers under IEEPA is ultra vires (exceeding statutory authority) because a foreign treaty-based international court performing judicial duties cannot objectively be classified as a foreign national security threat.⁵⁹

Second, that the blocking of their bank accounts and the cancellation of their health insurance without prior notice, a statement of reasons, or an opportunity to be heard violated the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.⁶⁰

Third, that the sanctions violate international judicial independence, a principle recognised and historically supported by the United States.⁶¹

D. DAWN v. Trump

On 15 July 2026, two advocacy groups, Democracy for the Arab World Now (“DAWN”) and the Taxpayer Alliance Against Genocide, filed suit against President Trump in the S.D.N.Y.⁶² The plaintiffs, represented by Joseph Pace, seek a declaration that Executive Order 14203 and its implementing regulations under 31 C.F.R. Part 528 are invalid on their face, describing the sanctions as viewpoint discrimination designed to police political expression and prevent Americans from compiling and submitting evidence of international atrocities.⁶³

This litigation came amid a sharp exchange between Secretary Rubio and DAWN over the organisation’s advocacy. In March 2026, DAWN had written to all states impacted by the regional war—including Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and Gulf states—calling on them to accept ICC jurisdiction so that all victims would have a pathway to justice.⁶⁴ Secretary Rubio’s op-ed mischaracterised DAWN’s call as focusing solely on U.S. actions, prompting DAWN’s Advocacy Director, Raed Jarrar, to respond that Secretary Rubio was attempting to dismantle the rules-based international order that grew out of the ashes of World War II.⁶⁵

E. Article 70 Implications

Under Article 70 of the Rome Statute, impeding, intimidating, or corruptly influencing an ICC official is criminalised. Leading human rights advocates, including Kenneth Roth, have argued that U.S. sanctions targeting judges and prosecutors for performing their judicial functions could themselves amount to an obstruction of justice within the meaning of Article 70.⁶⁶

VII. INTERNATIONAL RESISTANCE, COUNTERMEASURES, AND INSTITUTIONAL FRACTURES

A. Strategic Divergence with European Allies

The U.S. campaign to dismantle the ICC has generated significant friction with traditional democratic allies.⁶⁷ While the United States is not a member, nearly all of its European allies, alongside major security partners such as the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are among the 125 states parties to the Rome Statute.⁶⁸ For these nations, the ICC is a core component of the rules-based international order and a key instrument for pursuing accountability in conflicts such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.⁶⁹ Consequently, the U.S. campaign has forced a strategic divergence, as the administration pressures these countries to reject the Court’s authority or face a potential downgrading of bilateral security cooperation.⁷⁰

The European Union has rejected the U.S. assertion that the ICC threatens sovereignty, issuing official statements affirming that the Court acts only as an independent judicial backstop.⁷¹ In July 2026, EU spokesperson Anouar El Anouni condemned the whole-of-government campaign, stating that threats or restrictive measures targeting international judges, prosecutors, or cooperating civil society groups are unacceptable.⁷²

B. Activation of the EU Blocking Statute

Civil society groups, supported by Member States like Slovenia, have pressed the European Commission to activate the EU Blocking Statute (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96).⁷³ Originally designed in 1996 to counter the extraterritorial effects of U.S. sanctions on Cuba and Iran, the Statute would legally prohibit EU-based banks, corporations, and individuals from complying with U.S. sanctions targeting the ICC, while allowing them to recover damages arising from such sanctions.⁷³ Throughout 2025 and 2026, the European Parliament passed resolutions demanding that the Commission urgently incorporate U.S. anti-ICC sanctions into the Blocking Statute’s annex.⁷⁴

C. Judicial Protection: Jenec

In its judgment of June 2026 in Case C-81/24 Jenec, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the inclusion of a person on a third-country sanctions list does not, in itself, justify the automatic refusal by an EU bank to open a basic payment account, providing legal protection to targeted ICC officials seeking basic financial services within Europe.⁷⁵

D. Technological Independence and Infrastructure Migration

Because U.S. secondary sanctions prohibit American technology vendors from providing services to designated entities, the ICC has initiated an extensive infrastructure migration. The Court has begun shifting its entire digital ecosystem away from commercial U.S. cloud providers and enterprise software—such as Microsoft and Google—to independent, European-based software alternatives and sovereign data-hosting facilities to protect its operational communications and databases.⁷⁶

E. Relocation of Assembly of States Parties Sessions

The threat of travel bans and border detentions under U.S. visa policies has severely disrupted the Court’s administrative meetings. With the 25th Session of the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP25”) scheduled to take place in New York in December 2026, the Coalition for the ICC and various civil society networks have urged the ASP Bureau to either relocate the session to The Hague or adopt a split-session model, whereby formal judicial elections would be conducted in New York while all substantive, policy-making deliberations would be held in The Hague, where sanctioned civil society representatives, victims, and Court officials can participate without fear of detention.⁷⁷

F. Internal Administrative Challenges and Structural Fragility

The external pressure on the Court occurs alongside internal administrative challenges. In late 2025, the Assembly of States Parties addressed allegations of sexual misconduct against Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services was mandated to carry out an investigation, and an independent panel appointed in December 2025 concluded unanimously on 29 March 2026 that the OIOS investigation had not established any misconduct or breach of duty.⁷⁸ However, the ASP Bureau majority voted on 1 April 2026 to proceed with disciplinary action despite the panel’s findings, demonstrating internal administrative cleavages.⁷⁹

On 25 July 2026, the Assembly of States Parties voted 82–43 in a secret ballot to remove Khan from office — the first removal of a sitting prosecutor in the Court’s 24-year history.⁸⁰ Palestinian rights groups, former judges, and Khan’s own lawyers described the 18-month disciplinary process culminating in his removal as politicised. Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar described Khan’s removal as “long-delayed” and called on the Court to drop the arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant “immediately,” reiterating what the source describes as Israel’s debunked claim that the warrants were rushed to distract from the sexual misconduct allegations.⁸⁰

Furthermore, the U.S. pressure campaign coincides with a period of structural fragility for the Rome Statute system. In July 2026, three Sahelian countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—formally initiated the year-long withdrawal process from the Rome Statute, declaring the Court to be a tool of neocolonial repression.⁸¹ These actions follow the historical precedent of Burundi (withdrew 2017) and the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte (withdrew 2019), though countries like Gambia and South Africa reversed their planned exits in 2016.⁸² The convergence of unilateral U.S. targeting with regional withdrawals by African states presents a significant challenge to the universalist aspirations of the international criminal justice framework.⁸³

VIII. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

An objective assessment of the conflict indicates that while the diplomatic campaign to dismantle the ICC “brick by brick” is unlikely to achieve the statutory dissolution of a treaty-based international body, it possesses the capacity to significantly disrupt its operational and financial viability.⁸⁴ By shifting from a policy of defensive non-cooperation to a proactive programme utilising the global dominance of the U.S. financial system and technology infrastructure, the United States has constructed a highly coercive environment for the Court’s personnel and its civil society partners.⁸⁵ This approach, however, generates significant secondary and tertiary structural effects that carry complex geopolitical consequences.

A. Trans-Atlantic Alliance Strain

At the trans-Atlantic level, the campaign introduces a structural strain into the U.S. alliance network. For European allies, the preservation of the ICC is tied to their regional security objectives, particularly the legal delegitimisation of Russian actions in Ukraine.⁸⁶ By forcing these allies to choose between their security relationships with Washington and their treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, the campaign risks complicating coordination on other critical strategic files, such as NATO defence allocations and economic strategies toward China.⁸⁷ The pressure on European nations to activate blocking statutes to defend the ICC represents a direct collision over legal and economic sovereignty.⁷³

B. Acceleration of Structural Decoupling

In the technological and financial spheres, the aggressive application of extraterritorial secondary sanctions under Executive Order 14203 is accelerating a trend toward structural decoupling. By forcing international tribunals and global organisations to migrate away from dominant U.S.-based cloud providers, software systems, and clearing networks, the campaign inadvertently encourages the development of parallel, non-U.S.-dependent technological and financial infrastructures.⁷⁶ Over the long term, the emergence of these alternative systems could diminish the structural efficacy of U.S. sanctions as a foreign policy tool.⁸⁸

C. Erosion of the Rules-Based International Order

Finally, the selective application of international law—exemplified by U.S. support for ICC actions against Russian leadership contrasted with the systematic targeting of the Court over investigations in Gaza and Afghanistan—erodes the consensus underpinning the post-World War II rules-based international order.⁸⁹ While this approach seeks to maximise immediate strategic flexibility and insulate U.S. and allied personnel from external judicial oversight, it also reinforces narratives of Western exceptionalism.⁶⁶ The resulting polarisation of the international criminal justice system may ultimately yield a highly fragmented global legal landscape, characterised by competing regional structures and the decay of universalist judicial norms.⁹⁰

POSTSCRIPT — 26 July 2026

On 25 July 2026, the Assembly of States Parties voted 82–43 in a secret ballot at the United Nations in New York to remove Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan from office — the first removal of a sitting prosecutor in the ICC’s 24-year history. The vote concluded an 18-month disciplinary process that an independent panel, appointed in December 2025, had found unsubstantiated: on 29 March 2026, the panel concluded unanimously that the OIOS investigation had not established any misconduct or breach of duty. The ASP Bureau majority nonetheless voted on 1 April 2026 to proceed with disciplinary action. Palestinian rights groups, former judges, and Khan’s own lawyers have described the process as politicised. Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar characterised the removal as “long-delayed” and called on the Court to drop the arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant “immediately.” Khan’s departure represents the first major structural casualty of the dismantlement campaign described in this memorandum. The successor will inherit a post in which bank accounts are frozen, email accounts terminated, health insurance cancelled, and any institution attempting to assist faces U.S. secondary sanctions exposure.⁸⁰

[1]  Marco Rubio, ‘Op-Ed’ Wall Street Journal (13 July 2026); see also ‘Rubio Vows to Take Apart the International Criminal Court “Brick by Brick”‘ Military.com; ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026).

[2]  Ibid.; see also ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ FSI Stanford; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security.

[3]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ FSI Stanford; ‘International Criminal Court stands up to US campaign to dismantle it “brick by brick”‘ El País (22 July 2026).

[4]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘Marco Rubio Threatens to “Teach” the ICC the “Full Meaning of American Resolve”‘ Truthout; ‘Washington Policy Weekly’ Arab Center DC.

[5]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘NatSec Roundup: Iran blockade 2.0, ICC dismantlement, and Beijing gets advanced chips’ FDD Action (17 July 2026).

[6]  ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security.

[7]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security.

[8]  Ibid.

[9]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘NatSec Roundup: Iran blockade 2.0, ICC dismantlement, and Beijing gets advanced chips’ FDD Action (17 July 2026).

[10]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security.

[11]  Ibid.

[12]  Ibid.; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security.

[13]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026).

[14]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security.

[15]  ‘United States and the International Criminal Court’ Wikipedia; ‘The Future of US–ICC Relations (Chapter 6)’ in Above the Law (CUP); ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice: A complex and challenging relationship’ PGA.

[16]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘United States and the International Criminal Court’ Wikipedia; ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice: A complex and challenging relationship’ PGA.

[17]  ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ Council on Foreign Relations.

[18]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘United States and the International Criminal Court’ Wikipedia; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”: America’s shifting stance on the International Criminal Court’ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[19]  ‘United States and the International Criminal Court’ Wikipedia; ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice: A complex and challenging relationship’ PGA; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[20]  ‘United States and the International Criminal Court’ Wikipedia; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[21]  ‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ Wikipedia; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[22]  ‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ Wikipedia; ‘What was the reasoning behind the Hague Invasion Act?’ Reddit r/NeutralPolitics; ‘Hague Invasion Act: Can US invade Netherlands to protect Israel?’ The New Arab.

[23]  ‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ Wikipedia; ‘The US military can legally invade The Hague to free Americans from the ICC’ We Are The Mighty; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[24]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ Wikipedia; ‘US Opposition to the International Criminal Court’ Global Policy Forum; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[25]  ‘American Service-Members’ Protection Act’ Wikipedia.

[26]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice: A complex and challenging relationship’ PGA; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[27]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[28]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026).

[29]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘The ICC Has Real Flaws. Dismantling It Without an Alternative Is Not the Answer’ CFR; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard).

[30]  ‘International Criminal Court stands up to US campaign to dismantle it “brick by brick”‘ El País (22 July 2026).

[31]  ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice: A complex and challenging relationship’ PGA; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard); ‘Trump Administration Vows to Dismantle the International Criminal Court’ TIME (14 July 2026).

[32]  ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice: A complex and challenging relationship’ PGA; ‘Correcting Course: How Congress Can Streamline U.S. Engagement with the International Criminal Court’ Cardozo Law Review.

[33]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF.

[34]  ‘Executive Order 14203’ Wikipedia; ‘Executive Order 14203—Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ The American Presidency Project (UCSB).

[35]  ‘Executive Order 14203—Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ The American Presidency Project (UCSB); Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network).

[36]  Ibid.; Rona v Trump (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse).

[37]  ‘Executive Order 14203’ Wikipedia; ‘Executive Order 14203—Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ The American Presidency Project (UCSB); ‘FMEP Legislative Round-Up: June 7, 2024’ FMEP; ‘EO 14203 § 4 imposes entry restrictions on ICC-affiliated individuals’ Immigration Policy Tracking.

[38]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘Executive Order 14203—Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ The American Presidency Project (UCSB); Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network).

[39]  Ibid.

[40]  ‘Safeguarding Civil Society Participation at ASP25: The Case for Relocation or a Split Session’ CICC; ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions: “Criminalising Accountability”‘ CICC.

[41]  ‘Executive Order 14203’ Wikipedia; ‘STATEMENT ON THE EU BLOCKING STATUTE AND THE DEFENSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’ Union of European Federalists.

[42]  ‘EO 14203 § 4 imposes entry restrictions on ICC-affiliated individuals’ Immigration Policy Tracking; ‘Trump Administration Reinstates Sanctions on UN Special Rapporteur in Legal Battle Seesaw’ Charity & Security Network; ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF.

[43]  ‘Executive Order 14203’ Wikipedia; ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF.

[44]  ‘EO 14203 § 4 imposes entry restrictions on ICC-affiliated individuals’ Immigration Policy Tracking; ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[45]  ‘Executive Order 14203’ Wikipedia; ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF.

[46]  Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[47]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘NatSec Roundup: Iran blockade 2.0, ICC dismantlement, and Beijing gets advanced chips’ FDD Action (17 July 2026); ‘Trump Administration Vows to Dismantle the International Criminal Court’ TIME (14 July 2026); Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[48]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘CCBE Statement in support of the International Criminal Court in response to sanctions imposed by the US administration’ CCBE (22 July 2026); ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[49]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); ‘Trump Administration Reinstates Sanctions on UN Special Rapporteur in Legal Battle Seesaw’ Charity & Security Network; Rona v Trump (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse); ‘Gabor Rona and Lisa Davis v. Donald J. Trump et al.’ Open Society Justice Initiative.

[50]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); ‘EO 14203 § 4 imposes entry restrictions on ICC-affiliated individuals’ Immigration Policy Tracking; ‘Challenge to ICC Sanctions on First Amendment Grounds’ Washington Trade & Tariff Letter; ‘Activists accuse Trump of chilling free speech with ICC sanctions’ Courthouse News.

[51]  Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); Rona v Trump (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse); ‘EO 14203 § 4 imposes entry restrictions on ICC-affiliated individuals’ Immigration Policy Tracking; ‘Challenge to ICC Sanctions on First Amendment Grounds’ Washington Trade & Tariff Letter; ‘Gabor Rona and Lisa Davis v. Donald J. Trump et al.’ Open Society Justice Initiative.

[52]  Rona v Trump (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse); ‘Gabor Rona and Lisa Davis v. Donald J. Trump et al.’ Open Society Justice Initiative; ‘Lisa Davis’ CUNY School of Law; ‘CUNY School of Law’ FIRE.

[53]  Rona v Trump (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse); ‘Gabor Rona and Lisa Davis v. Donald J. Trump et al.’ Open Society Justice Initiative; ‘Judge bars Trump administration from punishing 2 law professors for ICC work’ San Juan Daily Star.

[54]  ‘Judge bars Trump administration from punishing 2 law professors for ICC work’ San Juan Daily Star; Rona v Trump (Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse).

[55]  ‘EO 14203 § 4 imposes entry restrictions on ICC-affiliated individuals’ Immigration Policy Tracking; ‘Trump Administration Reinstates Sanctions on UN Special Rapporteur in Legal Battle Seesaw’ Charity & Security Network.

[56]  ‘Trump Administration Reinstates Sanctions on UN Special Rapporteur in Legal Battle Seesaw’ Charity & Security Network.

[57]  Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); ‘Trump Administration Vows to Dismantle the International Criminal Court’ TIME (14 July 2026); ‘The Week That Was’ Lawfare.

[58]  ‘Trump Administration Vows to Dismantle the International Criminal Court’ TIME (14 July 2026).

[59]  Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network).

[60]  Ibid.

[61]  Ibid.

[62]  ‘Challenge to ICC Sanctions on First Amendment Grounds’ Washington Trade & Tariff Letter; ‘Activists accuse Trump of chilling free speech with ICC sanctions’ Courthouse News.

[63]  Ibid.

[64]  ‘Marco Rubio Threatens to “Teach” the ICC the “Full Meaning of American Resolve”‘ Truthout; ‘DAWN Statement on Secretary Rubio’s Wall Street Journal Op-Ed Threatening to “Dismantle” the ICC’ DAWN.

[65]  Ibid.

[66]  ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘Marco Rubio Threatens to “Teach” the ICC the “Full Meaning of American Resolve”‘ Truthout; ‘DAWN Statement on Secretary Rubio’s Wall Street Journal Op-Ed Threatening to “Dismantle” the ICC’ DAWN.

[67]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘NatSec Roundup: Iran blockade 2.0, ICC dismantlement, and Beijing gets advanced chips’ FDD Action (17 July 2026).

[68]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security.

[69]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘The ICC Has Real Flaws. Dismantling It Without an Alternative Is Not the Answer’ CFR; ‘PR | UEF Calls for Immediate EU Action to Protect the ICC and Activate the EU Blocking Statute’ Union of European Federalists.

[70]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘NatSec Roundup: Iran blockade 2.0, ICC dismantlement, and Beijing gets advanced chips’ FDD Action (17 July 2026); ‘Trump Administration Vows to Dismantle the International Criminal Court’ TIME (14 July 2026).

[71]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘EU rejects Trump administration claims that ICC threatens US sovereignty’ The Guardian (14 July 2026).

[72]  ‘EU rejects Trump administration claims that ICC threatens US sovereignty’ The Guardian (14 July 2026); ‘PR | UEF Calls for Immediate EU Action to Protect the ICC and Activate the EU Blocking Statute’ Union of European Federalists.

[73]  ‘STATEMENT ON THE EU BLOCKING STATUTE AND THE DEFENSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’ Union of European Federalists; ‘PR | UEF Calls for Immediate EU Action to Protect the ICC and Activate the EU Blocking Statute’ Union of European Federalists.

[74]  Ibid.

[75]  ‘CCBE Statement in support of the International Criminal Court in response to sanctions imposed by the US administration’ CCBE (22 July 2026).

[76]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘CCBE Statement in support of the International Criminal Court in response to sanctions imposed by the US administration’ CCBE (22 July 2026); ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[77]  ‘Safeguarding Civil Society Participation at ASP25: The Case for Relocation or a Split Session’ CICC.

[78]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘Independence of the ICC under Friendly Fire?’ International Law Blog (10 April 2026).

[79]  ‘Independence of the ICC under Friendly Fire?’ International Law Blog (10 April 2026).

[80]  Sondos Asem, ‘ICC member states vote to remove chief prosecutor Karim Khan’ Middle East Eye (25 July 2026); see also ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘Independence of the ICC under Friendly Fire?’ International Law Blog (10 April 2026).

[81]  ‘International Criminal Court stands up to US campaign to dismantle it “brick by brick”‘ El País (22 July 2026); ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ Council on Foreign Relations.

[82]  ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ Council on Foreign Relations.

[83]  ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘International Criminal Court stands up to US campaign to dismantle it “brick by brick”‘ El País (22 July 2026); ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ Council on Foreign Relations.

[84]  ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF.

[85]  ‘Rubio Vows to Dismantle the ICC Brick by Brick’ FPIF; ‘Trump Administration Vows to Dismantle the International Criminal Court’ TIME (14 July 2026); Prost v Trump (Charity & Security Network); ‘Safeguarding Civil Society Participation at ASP25’ CICC; ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[86]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘The ICC Has Real Flaws. Dismantling It Without an Alternative Is Not the Answer’ CFR; ‘PR | UEF Calls for Immediate EU Action to Protect the ICC and Activate the EU Blocking Statute’ Union of European Federalists.

[87]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security.

[88]  ‘CCBE Statement in support of the International Criminal Court in response to sanctions imposed by the US administration’ CCBE (22 July 2026); ‘Coalition for the ICC launches groundbreaking report on US sanctions’ CICC.

[89]  ‘The US Campaign Against the ICC Misunderstands How the Court Works’ Just Security; ‘US to seek dismantling of International Criminal Court, Rubio announces’ JURIST (13 July 2026); ‘In Context: Analyzing Secretary Rubio’s International Criminal Court Op-Ed’ Just Security; ‘Marco Rubio Threatens to “Teach” the ICC the “Full Meaning of American Resolve”‘ Truthout; ‘The ICC Has Real Flaws. Dismantling It Without an Alternative Is Not the Answer’ CFR; ‘From “Invade the Hague” to “Support the ICC”‘ Kathryn Sikkink (Harvard); ‘DAWN Statement on Secretary Rubio’s Wall Street Journal Op-Ed’ DAWN.

[90]  ‘International Criminal Court stands up to US campaign to dismantle it “brick by brick”‘ El País (22 July 2026); ‘The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ Council on Foreign Relations.