Russia: Why the World should be worried

Estimated reading time at 200 wpm: 6 minutes

Nobody dares to write anything negative on Russia? Why? Cuz you risk receiving a deadly dose of Polonium, Novichok, epibatidine, or some other ghastly poison. Well, I couldn’t give a flying banana! If Instagram is calling you, then fly down the page to ‘What it means‘.

Summary of Russia’s aggression

Source: Under Destruction – Munich Security Report 2026 (PDF) – 10 MB

Military Aggression and the War in Ukraine

• Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is now entering its fifth year and has reached “new heights of brutality and violence,” with Russia currently regaining tactical initiative along parts of the front [7, 57].
• Russia’s ongoing aggression constitutes “the most significant and direct threat” to NATO members and European security [57].
• The invasion has violated the norm of territorial integrity “in the most threatening and vivid way since the end of World War II” [57].
• Russia devoted 40 percent of its 2025 federal budget—equivalent to almost eight percent of its GDP—to security and defense to sustain its war economy [57].
• Intelligence estimates suggest that following a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, Russia could reconstitute its forces for a “regional war” in the Baltic Sea area within two years, and for a “local” war against a single neighbor within six months [57].
• Russia has employed persistent nuclear saber-rattling as a reminder that the military threat extends well beyond Ukraine [57].

Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage in Europe

• Moscow has intensified a hybrid warfare campaign across Europe, reflected in a growing number of suspected Russian incidents including sabotage, vandalism, cyberattacks, and arson [7, 57, 58].
• In September 2025 alone, approximately 20 Russian drones intruded into Polish airspace, while three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, prompting both governments to invoke NATO consultations under Article 4 [58].
• Russia is increasingly blending cyber and kinetic tactics in surveillance, sabotage operations, and attacks on energy grids, deliberately blurring the boundaries between war and peace [58].
• Many of these incidents are designed to remain deniable or ambiguous, enabling Russia to evade direct attribution while exerting psychological pressure and inducing political paralysis [58].

Threat Perceptions and Risk Assessments (Munich Security Index 2026)

• Declining Perception in G7: Across all G7 countries surveyed, the perceived seriousness of Russia as a risk has declined since 2024. Russia dropped from the second to the eighth most serious risk (out of 32 total risks) among G7 respondents [34, 19].
• Global South Perspective: In the BICS countries (Brazil, India, China, South Africa), Russia has consistently been ranked as one of the least serious risks since the Index began in 2021 [34].
• Country-Specific Risk Scores (2025):
  • Germany: Russia remains a top concern with an index score of 71; 48% of German respondents report feeling unprepared to deal with the threat [44].
  • United Kingdom: Russia is the third most serious risk (index score 69), despite a decrease of six index points since 2024 [47].
  • France: Russia scores 66 (down 7 points), ranking below radical Islamic terrorism and economic crisis [43].
  • Italy: Russia scores 55; 38% of Italian respondents still view their country as unprepared for the risk from Russia nearly four years after the full-scale invasion [45].
  • Japan: Russia scores 64 (down 6 points), ranking as the fourth most serious risk [46].
  • United States: Russia scores 56 (down 4 points), ranking below political polarisation and economic crisis [48].
  • Canada: Russia scores 52, representing a sharp decrease of 17 index points [42].
  • Brazil: Russia scores 39 (down 9 points) [49].
  • South Africa: Russia scores 39 (down 5 points) [52].
  • India: Russia scores 23 (unchanged), among the lowest concerns [51].
  • China: Russia scores 10 (down 8 points), representing the lowest risk perception of any surveyed country [50].

US Policy and Diplomatic Relations

• The 2025 US National Security Strategy conspicuously refrains from designating Russia as a threat, deprioritizing Europe in favor of the Western Hemisphere [61].
• President Trump and senior administration officials often display an “unsettling affinity for Russian President Vladimir Putin” [20].
• In 2025, Putin was welcomed with a red carpet in Alaska and treated as a “valued friend” without having offered any concessions, contrasting with the harsh treatment of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy [20].
• The Biden administration viewed support for Ukrainian self-defense against Russian aggression as both a strategic interest and a moral duty; the Trump administration has shifted toward pressuring Ukraine to hand over territory, effectively “rubberstamping Russia’s territorial expansion by force” [11, 20].
• A leaked US-backed 28-point peace plan from November 2025 leaned heavily toward Russian interests, envisioning sweeping Ukrainian territorial concessions, strict limits on Ukraine’s future force size, and exclusion from NATO membership, while demanding almost no concessions from Moscow [59].

Economic and Budgetary Aspects

• Russia’s war in Ukraine has prompted several European countries to prioritise defense spending over development assistance and other budget priorities [87, 77].
• European NATO members boosted defense budgets by approximately 41% between 2021 and 2025, driven by recognition of the Russian threat [62].

Institutional and Development Context

• At the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Chinese Director-General Qu Dongyu has refused to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine and has not acknowledged it as a cause of increased global food insecurity [92].

What the evidence on Russia evidence actually means

For ordinary people this is what it means.

The threat is real and happening now: Russia isn’t just fighting in Ukraine—it is actively probing and attacking Europe itself. Drones are flying into Polish airspace, jets are breaching Estonian airspace, and mysterious sabotage (pipelines, cables, arson) is increasing across the continent [57-58]. Moscow is preparing for a potential next war—intelligence suggests they could be ready to attack the Baltic region within two years of any Ukraine ceasefire [57].

But the world is dangerously divided on whether to care: There is a stark split in who sees Russia as a problem. In Western Europe, people are still worried (especially in Germany and the UK), but concern has actually dropped since last year [19, 42-48]. Meanwhile, major powers like China, India, and Brazil rank Russia as one of the least serious threats in the world—barely a concern at all [34, 49-52]. This means you cannot count on a united global response; half the world sees this as Europe’s problem, not theirs.

America is sending mixed signals, leaving Europe exposed: The US—the traditional protector—is acting strangely. Official documents no longer even list Russia as a threat [61], President Trump openly admires Putin [20], and Washington is pressuring Ukraine to give up territory rather than helping them win [59]. At the same time, Trump demands Europe spend more on defense while threatening trade wars that weaken European economies [60-61]. This leaves Europeans in a bind: they still need American military help, but can no longer trust that America has their back.

The old rules are breaking: For 80 years, the basic rule was “you cannot invade your neighbor and keep the land.” Russia is testing whether that rule still exists. Because the US is now treating Ukraine’s territory as a bargaining chip rather than a principle [26], the fear is that “might makes right” is returning. If Russia succeeds, the lesson is that powerful countries can redraw borders by force—and Europe may be next [64].

Europe has to choose: grow up fast or face the consequences: Because America is unreliable and Russia is preparing for potential future conflicts, Europeans face an uncomfortable reality: they must rapidly learn to defend themselves or risk being crushed between a hostile Russia and an indifferent America [62-64]. The choice is essentially “pay now for your own defense, or pay later in blood” [64].